Unveiling the Complex Relationship Between Ahmed al-Sharaa and Al-Qaeda in the Levant

Ahmed al-Sharaa was active in the Syrian civil war especially as the leader of groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Hay ‘Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. The Syrian militant’s transformation from an Al-Qaeda affiliate to a nationalist turned jihadist leader explains the complexity of jihadist activities in Levant.

Al-Sharaa’s relationship with Al-Qaeda started in 2001 when he was in Iraq as a member of the organisation. He was transferred to Syria in 2011 from the United States’ prison camp in Iraq to develop an offshoot from Al-Qaeda during the revolt against President Bashir al-Assad. This move created Jabhat al-Nusra, probably the second most powerful insurgency group, in Syria.

While helping Assad on the battle field, Jabhat al-Nusra’s affiliation to Al-Qaeda limited the group’s ability in establishing a wide support base in Syria. Understanding this, al-Sharaa declared in July 2016 that JN was actually disentangling from Al-Qaeda and renaming to JFS. This was concerning viewed with the observation of the group trying to merge further into the Syrian revolutionary theatre and thus diluting the international terrorists’ tag that was constantly being levelled against the group.

The rebranding exercise however did not leave the international community totally sold. As an example, the United States administration insisted that JFS is simply another Al-Qaeda in Syria in all but name. This scepticism stemmed in specific from the perception that the ideological and operational goals of the organisation had not wandered far from al Qaeda, despite its official organisational split from it.

Subsequently, in January 2017, al-Sharaa went a notch higher and joined other groups to form JFS with other factions forming Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Although HTS claimed to be a Syrian opposition group, many critics consider it a new iteration of al-Sharaa’s prior organisations, continuing jihadists’ key founding principles while attempting to establish more popularity among Syrian warriors and residents.

The group has been operating or controlling large portions of Idlib province since al-Sharaa’s leadership, has tried to establish administration and political legitimacy. However, its past connexions and the RIGHT-WING militant of the representatives during January 2009 continue to be a foundation for concerns about the intention and the extent to which the organisation has evolved from Al-Qaeda’s jihadist aspirations.

Therefore, Ahmed al-Sharaa’s case shows the labile and dual characteristics of the relationships between actors of the various jihadist organisations in the Levant. His attempts to negotiate the often murky waters of Syrian opposition politics and relations with Al-Qaeda show that it is often hard to draw a line between ‘troublesome but local insurgent goals’ and more sinister extreme agendas.